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Problems with Steve Pinker's





have different concepts I use depending on the language I am speaking.
In Cape Verdean creole, there is the concept of morabeza-one that
speaks of the culture's attitude toward all people. It teaches us to walk
the street with an open heart, a smile and spirit to help the next man. As
my father still tells me: ~When you meet people remember to show them your
morabeza, and you will see the relationship nourish smoothly:' It is the idea of
hospitality without expectation of return, without worry ofone's own resources.
It is also the spirit of bonhomie, of universal friendliness. This is an attitude that
one takes, the way one conducts oneself-implicitJy. Although this is the basic
idea, we do not have a word in English that precisely mirrors it.
In this paper, I want to consider the claim that not all languages have
the same power to express the meaning that the speaker intends. Examples
like the one above give us an idea of the phenomenon: I will be looking at
some other examples in detail later. I will argue that this is because there
are concepts that are culture-specific in as much as language is a vehicle for
the culture. To understand what I mean by culture-specific concepts, let us
consider the Portuguese concept of Saudade. The best way to explain this
idea is to synthesize the ideas of melancholy, nostalgia, homesickness, filial
love, immigration and a spirit of longing for the sailors and explorers of the
15th century into a duster of concepts. Although it can be explained to people
so that a fairly dose understanding is reached, there is something about that
concept that is ineffable to persons unfamiliar with the Portuguese way of life.
This long*winded grocery list would not be necessary were I giving this paper
to a room full of my compatriots. It is something that is understood. To be
Portuguese is to be well acquainted with this concept. This suggests that along
with membership in a culture comes a package ofconcepts. Moreover, these
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concepts are not shared cross-culturally. It has long been
understood that language is a powerful tool for cultural
conservation. Part of what it is to be a member of a given
community is to speak the language in lhe ways lhat the
members of that culture do. This suggests the idea that
language is a vehicle for culture, especially with regard
to such culturally rich and specific concepts like those I
mentioned above.
The questions I have been shaping are as follows: Do
the concepts we acquire depend on the culture we live in?
Or does acquisition of any language guarantee that we
have certain concepts? In I1Je Language Instinct, Steve
Pinker argues the latter. This position stems from linguistic
nativism. which I will discuss below. In the end. I think we
will see that Pinker's nativism seems to work well for most
concepts; although it is not clear how distinctive cultural
concepts fit it, it may be possible to decompose them into
basic notions common to all language users.
Pinker and Nativism
Nativist theories of language all argue that our
capacities to understand and produce language are innate,
or built-in. Before the revival of nativism, behaviorism
was the leading account of language and its development.
Behaviorist theories explained language acquisition and
development with a series of stimulus-response patterns
ultimately resulting in a 'storage bin' theory-where
children store phrases that they are exposed to in the
environment and call upon them when the situation arises.
This view's infrastructure was determined by principles
like operant conditioning. A plausible example of the
behaviorist model of language acquisition might look like
this: a baby says "da da" in the presence of Daddy, and
the parents show their approval. Gradually, parents make
their approval contingent upon increasingly accurate and
complex utterances.
THf UNDElCRADUATE REVIEW
For Pinker, human language is not learned but
something that is a feature ofour design just as much as
our upright posture. He purports that "humans know
how to talk more or less in the sense that spiders know
how to spin webs"(Pinker, 18). Furthermore, his view of
language in this way seeks to disabuse his readers of the
notion that language is some kind of cultural invention.
He wants us to think of language as another feature ofour
design that is complementary to our success and survival
in our environment. In other words, bats use echo-location
to help them navigate their environment and Pinker
says that language is an evolutionary adaptation of this
sort-"a biological adaptation to communicate information"
(Pinker, 19). As such, it follows that this capacity would
be qualitatively similar in any healthy human beings. The
fact that we use language to communicate is no different
than the idea that we use our legs to walk or that birds
have wings for flying. Fundamentally, Pinker's nativism
comes from a deeply found correlation between form and
function.
Pinker's approach to language is heavily influenced
by the work of the eminent linguist Noam Chomsky.
Chomsky disputed behaviorist theories and spearheaded
the revival of linguistic nativism by calling our attention
to two fundamental facts about language: I) we have an
unlimited capacity to understand sentences in natural
language-for in any language there is an arbitrarily
large number of possible sentences; we are exposed to
sentences that we have never heard before, but have
no problem understanding and processing them. This
forcefully suggests that language cannot be a repertoire
of pre-packaged responses-the brain must have some
mechanism to build an unlimited set of responses from a
limited vocabulary. He called this Universal Grammar. 2)
Children develop this grammar rapidly and without formal
instruction while giving consistent interpretations of novel
sentences that they never encountered.
Chomsky proposes a grammatical analysis ofour
understanding of language that purports to explain how it
is that we understand sentences the way we do. Consider
for example, the two phrases:
1) John is eager to please.
2) John is easy to please.
On the surface. the two sentences share the same
structure consisting of a subject (John), predicate (is),
modifier (eager/easy), and infinitive (to please). How do we
know that their meanings are different? Chomsky suggested
that their meanings are revealed by their deeper structures.
In sentence 1, John is the subject. He is the one who
pleases. In sentence 2, John is the object; others please him.
As we can see, it would be very difficult for our parents
to teach us such a distinction at 4 years of age. Natural
languages have different surface structures but share the
same deep structure. This may raise questions because not
all natural languages have the same structure. Consider the
following:
3) John hit Bill. (Bill is the one hit.
not the hitter)
In Japanese it would look something like this: John Bill
hit. English and Japanese are examples of 'head-first' and
'head-last' languages respectively. In Japanese, the ordering
is different but there is a way to disambiguate the agent
of the action from the recipient of the action. in English,
order matters, so we use ordering for disambiguating
subjects from objects, but in many other languages order is
less important; so there are other grammatical rules at work
to help us make sense of sentences. And this is too hard to
learn. so we do not learn it. This is where Pinker's nativism
can help us make sense ofsuch difficult phenomena,
especially bearing in mind that children begin to master
these ideas by the age of five or six years.
as
Challenges for Mentalese
One of the objectives in Pinker's introduction
of Mentalese was to debunk the idea that people think
in different languages. Pinker argues that Mentalese is
the language ofcognition, and also the 'translator' of
mental events. To draw an analogy with a computer:
Mentalese is our operating system working as deeply as the
computational level which serves as the translating device
for our (verbal) output monitors.
Nativism has enjoyed a large following, and, as
we have seen, there is much empirical evidence in its
favor from many fields. However. I see a need for some
qualifications in the present conception of Mentalese
with respect to bilingual speakers. If Mentalese is true,
then it follows that concepts appearing in all languages
must come from the same conceptual base. Along with
my grandmother-an avid defender of the 'Portuguese
sensibility'-I will suggest that this cannot be all there is
to the story. 1will look at some cases from bilingualism
to see if such speakers seem to be drawing from separate
conceptual bases or whether different languages have their
foundations in one set of concepts.
All About Bilingualism/ tudo sobre bilingualismo
All along I have been talking about the difficulty of
expressing cultural concepts to people that are not active
members of that culture. Although this may say something
about the expressiveness inherent in natural languages, it
points only indirectly to the problem of mentalese.
It is obviously very difficult to have conversations
about phenomenal properties ofcultural concepts-
especially when the parties involved are not members of
the same culture. The problems presented by bilingualism
are particularly interesting because they posit the problem
BlIDGIlWATEIt STATII COLLEGE
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in a different light. They avoid problems ofaccess to others'
consciousness and address problems of Mentalese within
the same person. This is where I find the real puzzle.
It is all too easy to dismiss the questions I have raised
by pointing out that interpersonal communication is
complicated because it involves many complex processes-
cultural experience. personal maturation, varying levels of
eloquence in verbal behavior etc.
By positing the problem within the same person-a
person like myself who is functionally fluent in more than
one language-we can escape such a criticism.
With the concept of saudade then. it is clear that I know
the concept for I grew up with it and use it in sentences
without evoking faces of bewilderment from other
Portuguese speakers. The problem is evident when I try to
find an English cognate that explains the concept to myself
Somehow I lose something. I have to engage in a program
of verbal acrobatics to even think about the concept in the
right ways. (For one can have saudades orJeel saudades)
For an illustration of this please refer to Fig. 1 in the
Appendix.
One popular analysis of bilingualism is that
there are multiple conceptual bases from which bilingual
speakers draw their concepts. [n other words I would have
one English-Mentalese track where my English verbal
behavior happens and a Portuguese-Mentalese track where
my Portuguese verbal behavior happens. This may explain
why we have such hard time trying to convey such ideas
cross-culturally. linguists offer one way of understanding
how this cross-linguistic capacity works through an
explanation of the phenomenon they call code switching.
Code switching requires a high degree of
proficiency in both languages. Code switching is the
selection by bilinguals (or multilinguals) of forms from
an embedded (l2) variety (or varieties) in utterances of a
matrix (ll) variety during the same conversation. Code
switching can be intersentential (from one language to the
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other between sentences) or intrasentential (occurring
within the same sentence or sentence fragment)"Code
switching of languages offers bilinguals a way to increase
their flexibility ofexpression going beyond the style-
switching of monolinguals. That is. switching is a means
to index the nuances of social relationships by exploiting
the socio-psychological associations of the languages
employed" (Myers-Scotton. 1992). Research suggests that
there is this relationship between matrix and embedded
languages. During the l2 acquisition the speaker will
economize efforts by attaching the new embedded language
concepts to concepts he/she already knows in the matrix
language. Consider for example what would happen in
a Spanish (Ml) native during English (El) acquisition;
chair is linked to silla, water to agua and so on. For an
illustration please refer to Fig. 2 in the Appendix.
This suggests that there are two parallel conceptual
bases working at any time.The question that remains is:
what happens when there is no arrow pointing from the
L2 expression to something in L1? There is NOT a failure
of understanding. so the concept HAS to come from
somewhere. Two possibilities;
l)There is some more basic set
of concepts found in Mentalese from
which all of the concepts in Ll and
L2 can be composed. This supports
Mentalese.
2)There is an alternative set of
concepts in L2 only acquired through
learning L2-this suggests that
Mentalese is false.
The way to determine which is true requires
both making clear the logical form of the system of
representation of Mentalese and testing it empirically by
looking at cases of uniquely expressive phrases in other
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languages. In a summer project. in 2005. I pursued both Conclusion
of these avenues. For now, let me say that we may have to I have pointed to some cases from bilingual experience
posit two parallel mentalese structures; Pinker mentions that suggests a special expressiveness inherent in each
this: ~ it could be that English speakers think in some kind language. I have also considered whether bilingualism
of simplified annotated quasi~English and that Apache operates on parallel conceptual bases or if it emerges from
speakers think in some kind of simplified and annotated an even more basic combinatorial system. I have done this
quasi-Apache with the design I have just descrihed"(Pinker, to point to the conceptual implications that bilingualism
82). If this is true. it seems to undermine mentalese. brings to theories of Mentalese; and as preliminary work
to help frame questions that need. to be addressed in an
interdisciplinary exploration I engaged. in last summer.
Although bilingualism's place is not clear in the Mentalese










Note that there is no problem in the translation from the computational level to the natural language. The problem is
evidenced. in the attempt ofcross*cuhural translation.
Fig. 2
(U) Esp_Mentalese Silla Agua , ,
t t t t
(L2) Ens-Mentalese Chair Water Nice Gnawing Pain
This suggests that there are two conceptual bases working at one time.
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